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Local oscillator fluctuation opens a loophole for Eve in practical continuous-variable
quantum-key-distribution systems
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We consider the security of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution implementa-
tion with the local oscillator (LO) fluctuating in time, which opens a loophole for Eve to intercept
the secret key. We show that Eve can simulate this fluctuation to hide her Gaussian collective
attack by reducing the intensity of the LO. Numerical simulations demonstrate that, if Bob does
not monitor the LO intensity and does not scale his measurements with the instantaneous intensity
values of LO, the secret key rate will be compromised severely.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable quantum-key distribution
(CVQKD), as an unconditionally secure communi-
cation scheme between two legitimate parties Alice and
Bob, has achieved advanced improvements in theoretical
analysis and experimental implementation in recent
years [1–5]. Practical implementation systems, such
as fiber-based Gaussian-modulated [6–9] and discrete-
modulated [10, 11] coherent-state protocol QKD systems
over tens of kilometers, have been demonstrated in a
few groups. The unconditional security of such systems
with prepare-and-measure (PM) implementation has
been confirmed by the security analysis of the equivalent
entanglement-based (EB) scheme [12–14].
However, the traditional security analysis of the EB
scheme of CVQKD just includes the signal beam and not
the local oscillator (LO), which is an auxiliary light beam
used as a reference to define the phase of the signal state
and is necessary for balanced homodyne detection. This
will leave some security loopholes for Eve because LO
is also unfortunately within Eve’s manipulating domain.
The necessity of monitoring LO intensity for the security
proofs in discrete QKD protocols embedded in continu-
ous variables has been discussed [15]. Moreover, in [16],
the excess noise caused by imperfect subtraction of bal-
anced homodyne detector (BHD) in the presence of LO
intensity fluctuations has been noted and quantified with
a formulation. However, in the practical implementation
of CVQKD, shot noise scaling with LO power measured
before keys distribution is still assumed to keep constant
if the fluctuations of LO intensity are small. And in this
circumstance, pulses with large fluctuation are just dis-
carded as shown in [16]. Unfortunately, this will give
Eve some advantages in exploiting the fluctuation of LO
intensity.
In this paper, we first describe Bob’s measurements
under this fluctuation of LO intensity, and propose an at-
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tacking scheme exploiting this fluctuation. We consider
the security of practical CVQKD implementation under
this attack and calculate the secret key rate with and
without Bob monitoring the LO for reverse and direct
reconciliation protocol. And then, we give a qualitative
analysis about the effect of this LO intensity fluctuation
on the secret key rate Alice and Bob hold. We find that
the fluctuation of LO could compromise the secret keys
severely if Bob does not scale his measurements with the
instantaneous LO intensity values. Finally, we briefly dis-
cuss the accurate monitoring of LO intensity to confirm
the security of the practical implementation of CVQKD.
II. LOCAL OSCILLATOR INTENSITY
FLUCTUATION AND ATTACK
Generally, in practical systems of CVQKD, the local
oscillator intensity is always monitored by splitting a
small part with a beam splitter, and pulses with large LO
intensity fluctuation are discarded too. However, even
with such monitoring, we do not yet clearly understand
how fluctuation, in particular small fluctuation, affects
the secret key rate. To confirm that the secret key rate
obtained by Alice and Bob is unconditionally secure, in
what follows, we will analyze the effects of this fluctua-
tion on the secret key rate only, and do not consider the
imperfect measurement of BHD due to incomplete sub-
traction of it in the presence of LO intensity fluctuations,
which has been discussed in [16].
Ideally, with a strong LO, a perfect pulsed BHD mea-
suring a weak signal whose encodings are XS ∈ {QS, PS}
will output the results[17],
xθ = k|αLO|(Qin cos θ + Pin sin θ), (1)
where k is a proportional constant of BHD, αLO is the
amplitude of LO, θ is the relative phase between the
signal and LO except for the signal’s initial modulation
phase. So scaling with LO power or shot noise, the results
can be recast as
XˆO = Xˆin = XS + XˆN , (2)
2with θ in Eq. (1) is 0 or π/2. Here the quadratures Q and
P are defined as Xˆin ∈ {Qˆin, Pˆin} and XˆN ∈ {QˆN , PˆN},
where XˆN is the quadrature of the vacuum state.
However, in a practical system, the LO intensity fluc-
tuates in time during key distribution. With a propor-
tional coefficient η > 0, practical LO intensity can be
described as |α′LO|2 = η|αLO|2, where αLO is the initial
amplitude of LO used by normalization and its value is
calibrated before key distribution by Alice and Bob. If
we do not monitor LO or quantify its fluctuation [18], es-
pecially just let the outputs of BHD scale with the initial
intensity or power of LO, the outputs then read
Xˆ
′
O =
√
ηXˆO. (3)
Unfortunately, this fluctuation will open a loophole for
Eve, as we will see in the following sections.
In conventional security analysis, like the EB scheme
equivalent to the usual PM implementation depicted in
Fig. 1(a), LO is not taken into consideration and its in-
tensity is assumed to keep unchanged. However, in prac-
tical implementation, Eve could intercept not only the
signal beam but also the LO, and she can replace the
quantum channel between Alice and Bob with her own
perfect quantum channel as shown in Figs. 1(b) and 1(c).
In so doing, Eve’s attack can be partially hidden by re-
ducing the intensity of LO with a variable attenuator
simulating the fluctuation without changing LO’s phase,
and such an attack can be called a LO intensity attack
(LOIA). In the following analysis, we will see that, in the
parameter-estimation procedure between Alice and Bob,
channel excess noise introduced by Eve can be reduced
arbitrarily, even to its being null, just by tuning the LO
transmission. Consequently, Alice and Bob would un-
derestimate Eve’s intercepted information and Eve could
get partial secret keys that Alice and Bob hold without
being found under this attack.
Figure 1(b) describes the LOIA, which consists of at-
tacking the signal beam with a general Gaussian collec-
tive attack [12–14] and attacking the LO beam with an
intensity attenuation by a non-changing phase attenu-
ator A, such as a beam splitter whose transmission is
variable. This signal-beam Gaussian collective attack
consists of three steps: Eve interacts her ancilla modes
with the signal mode by a unitary operation U for each
pulse and stores them in her quantum memory, then she
makes an optimal collective measurement after Alice and
Bob’s classical communication. Figure 1(c) is one practi-
cal LOIA with U being a beam-splitter transformation.
Its signal attack is also called an entangling cloner attack,
which was presented first by Grosshan [20] and improved
by Weedbrook [21, 22]. In Appendix A, we will demon-
strate that with this entangling cloner, Eve can get the
same amount of information as that shown in Fig. 1(b).
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FIG. 1. (a) EB scheme, based on Alice heterodyning one half
of the modes of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen(EPR) [19] state
and Bob homodyning the other half, with Eve only attacking
the signal. (b) LOIA consisting of attacking the signal beam
with a general Gaussian collective attack and attacking LO
with intensity attenuation by a non-changing phase attenua-
tor A such as a beam splitter whose transmission is variable.
U is a unitary operation and XE is Eve’s intercepted mode.
(c) LOIA with U being a beam-splitter transformation and
Eve’s ancilla modes XE0 and XE2 being the EPR pairs with
variance N , and XE1 is the intercepted mode. This signal
attack is also called an entangling cloner attack.
III. ESTIMATION OF SECRET KEY RATE
UNDER LOIA
We analyze a practical CVQKD system with homo-
dyne protocol to demonstrate the effect of LOIA on the
secret key rate, and for simplicity we do not give the re-
sults of the heterodyne protocol, which is analogous to
the homodyne protocol. In the usual PM implementa-
tion, Alice prepares a series of coherent states centered
on XS ∈ {QS, PS} with each pulse, and then she sends
them to Bob through a quantum channel which might
be intercepted by Eve. Here, QS and PS , respectively,
satisfy a Gaussian distribution independently with the
same variance VS and zero mean. This initial mode pre-
pared by Alice can be described as XˆA = XS + XˆN ,
and XˆA ∈ {QˆA, PˆA} is the quadrature variable. Here
XˆN ∈ {QˆN , PˆN} describes the quadrature of the vacuum
mode. Note that we denote an operator with a hat, while
without a hat the same variable corresponds to the clas-
sical variable after measurement. So the overall variance
of the initial mode prepared by Alice is V = VS + 1.
When this mode comes to Bob, Bob will get a mode
XˆB ∈ {QˆB, PˆB},
XˆB =
√
TXˆA +
√
1− TEˆ, (4)
where Eˆ describes Eve’s mode introduced through the
quantum channel whose quadrature variance is N . Bob
randomly selects a quadrature to measure, and if Eve
attenuates the LO intensity during the key distribution,
but Bob’s outputs still scale with the initial LO intensity,
3just as in Eq. (3), he will get the measurement
XwB =
√
ηXB =
√
η(
√
TXA +
√
1− TE), (5)
where XB is QB ∈ R (or equivalently PB ∈ R). How-
ever, if Bob monitors LO and also scales with the in-
stantaneous intensity value of LO with each pulse, he
will get XB without any loss of course. Note that, for
computation simplicity, hereafter we assume the variable
transmission rate η (or attenuation rate 1 − η) of each
pulse of LO is the same without loss of generality. Thus
the variance of Bob’s measurements and conditional vari-
ance on Alice’s encodings with and without monitoring
(in what follows, without monitoring specially indicates
that Bob’s measurement is obtained just by scaling with
the initial LO intensity instead of monitoring instanta-
neous values, and vice versa) can be given by
VB = TV + (1− T )N , (6)
V wB = η [TV + (1− T )N ] , (7)
VB|A = T + (1− T )N , (8)
V wB|A = η [T + (1− T )N ] , (9)
where the superscript w indicates “without monitoring”
and all variances are in shot-noise units; the conditional
variance is defined as [23]
VX|Y = V (X)−
|〈XY 〉|2
V (Y )
. (10)
Hence, the covariance matrix of Alice’s and Bob’s
modes can be obtained as
γAB(V, T,N) =
(
γA σ
T
AB
σAB γB
)
=
(
V I
√
T (V 2 − 1)σz√
T (V 2 − 1)σz [TV + (1− T )N ]I
)
,
(11)
γwAB =
(
V I
√
ηT (V 2 − 1)σz√
ηT (V 2 − 1)σz η[TV + (1− T )N ]I
)
, (12)
where σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
is the Pauli matrix and I is a unit
matrix.
From Eqs. (6) and (7) we can derive that the channel
transmission and excess noise are T , ε = (1−T )(N−1)/T
with monitoring, and ηT , εw = ε − 1
T
( 1
η
− 1) without
monitoring. Hence, by attenuating the LO intensity as
Fig. 1 shows, to make 0 < η < 1, Eve could arbitrarily
reduce εw to zero, thus she will get the largest amount
of information permitted by physics. In the following
numerical simulation we always make εw = 0, namely,
η(1 − T )N = 1 − ηT . Thus, the covariance matrix
γwAB = γAB(V, ηT, 1) and Eve’s introducing noise N [in
an entangling cloner it is Eve’s EPR state’s variance as
Fig. 1(c) shows] should be selected to be
N =
1− ηT
η(1− T ) . (13)
To estimate the secret key rate, without loss of generality,
we first analyze the reverse reconciliation then consider
the direct reconciliation.
A. Reverse reconciliation
From Alice and Bob’s points of view, the secret key
rate for reverse reconciliation with monitoring or not are
given, respectively, by
KRR = IAB − χBE , (14)
KwRR = I
w
AB − χwBE , (15)
where the mutual information between Alice and Bob
with and without monitoring are the same, and that is
IAB =
1
2
log2
VB
VB|A
=
1
2
log2
V wB
V w
B|A
= IwAB . (16)
This is because Bob’s measurements in these two cases
are just different with a coefficient η, and they corre-
spond with each other one by one, so they are equivalent
according to the data-processing theorem [24, 25]. How-
ever, the mutual information between Eve and Bob given
by the Holevo bound [26] in these two cases is not iden-
tical. As the previous analysis showed, in Bob’s point
of view, channel transmission and the excess noise esti-
mation are different. But from Eve’s point of view, they
are identical according to the data-processing theorem
because she estimates Bob’s measurements in these two
cases just by multiplying a coefficient η. We’ll calculate
the real information intercepted by Eve first. It can be
given by
χBE = S(E)− S(E|B), (17)
where S(·) is the Von Neumann entropy [27]. For a Gaus-
sian state ̺, this entropy can be calculated by the sym-
plectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix γ character-
izing ̺ [28]. To calculate Eve’s information, first Eve’s
system E can purify AB permitted by quantum physics,
so that S(E) = S(AB). Second, after Bob’s projective
measurement, the system AE is pure, so that S(E|B) =
S(A|B). Designating a = V , b = TV + (1 − T )N , and
c =
√
T (V 2 − 1), the symplectic eigenvalues of γAB are
given by
λ1,2 =
√
A∓√A2 − 4B2
2
, (18)
where A = a2 + b2 − 2c2 and B = ab− c2. Similarly, the
entropy S(A|B) is determined by the symplectic eigen-
value λ3 of the covariance matrix γ
XˆB
A [29], namely,
γXˆBA = γA − σTAB(XγBX)MP σAB, (19)
where X =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and MP stands for the Moore-Penrose
inverse of a matrix. Then λ3 =
√
(1−T )NV 2+TV
TV+(1−T )N , and the
Holevo bound reads
χBE(V, T,N) = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
−G
(
λ3 − 1
2
)
,
(20)
4where G(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2 x. However,
Eve’s information estimated by Bob without monitoring
is given by
χwBE = χBE(V, ηT, 1). (21)
By substituting Eqs. (20) and (21) into Eqs. (14) and
(15), respectively, the secret key rate with and without
Bob’s monitoring can be obtained. However, the secret
key rate in Eq. (15) without monitoring is unsecured in
evidence. Eve’s interception of partial information from
KwRR is not detected, in other words, Alice and Bob un-
derestimate Eve’s information without realizing it. Ac-
tually, the real or unconditionally secure secret key rate
KwRR, which we called a truly secret key rate, should be
available by replacing χwBE in Eq. (15) with Eq. (20).
Note that it is identical with the monitoring secret key
rate in Eq. (14) due to Eq. (16).
We investigate the secret key rate KwRR Bob measured
without monitoring and the true one or equivalently mon-
itoring one KRR for reverse reconciliation under Eve at-
tacking the intensity of LO during key distribution. As
Fig. 2 shows, with various values of transmission of LO
that can be controlled by Eve, the truly secret key rate
Alice and Bob actually share decreases rapidly over long
distances or small channel transmissions.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Reverse reconciliation pseudosecret key
rate and the truly secret one vs channel transmission T under
LOIA. Solid lines are secret key rate estimated by Bob with-
out monitoring LO intensity and dashed lines are the truly
secret ones. Colored lines correspond to the LO transmis-
sions η as labeled. Here Alice’s modulation variance VS = 20.
Additionally, because the mutual information between
Alice and Bob with and without monitoring is identical
as Eq.(16) shows, subtracting Eq. (14) from Eq. (15) we
can estimate Eve’s intercepted information (KwRR−KRR)
which is plotted in Fig. 3. We find that Eve could get
partial or full secret keys which Alice and Bob hold by
controlling the different transmissions of LO. Taking a
20-km transmission distance as an example, surprisingly,
just with LO intensity fluctuation or attenuating rate
0.08, Eve is able to obtain the full secret keys for reverse
reconciliation without Bob’s monitoring the LO.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Reverse reconciliation pseudosecret key
rate (dashed lines) and intercepted one (solid lines) by Eve
without being found vs LO intensity fluctuation rate (1− η)
with different transmission distances. From top to bottom
the transmission distances are labeled, and the fiber loss is
0.2 dB/km. Inset is an amplified graph with (1− η) between
0 ∼ 0.16. Here Alice’s modulation variance VS = 20.
B. Direct reconciliation
We now calculate the secret key rate for direct rec-
onciliation, which is a little more complicated, and we
investigate the effect of LO intensity attack by Eve on
CVQKD. The secret key rate estimated by Bob with and
without LO monitoring is given, respectively, by
KDR = IAB − χAE , (22)
KwDR = I
w
AB − χwAE . (23)
Note that we have already calculated IAB and I
w
AB in
Eq.(16) and they are identical for direct and reverse rec-
onciliation. For Eve we have
χAE = S(E)− S(E|A), (24)
where S(E) = S(AB) has been already computed in
the previous section, and S(E|A) = S(BC|A) using
the fact that after Alice’s projective measurement on
modes A0 and C0 obtaining QA in the EB scheme shown
in Fig. 1(a), the system BCE is pure. To calculate
5S(BC|A), we have to compute the symplectic eigenvalues
of covariance matrix γXˆABC , which is obtained by
γXˆABC = γBC − σTBCA(XγAX)MPσBCA, (25)
where γBC and σBCA can be read in the decomposition
of the matrix
γBCA =
(
γBC σ
T
BCA
σBCA γA
)
, (26)
which is available by elementary transformation of the
matrix [see Fig. 1(a)] [6, 29]
γACB =
(
SBSA0C0 ⊕ IB
)T
γA0C0B
(
SBSA0C0 ⊕ IB
)
, (27)
where IB is a unit matrix. It is obtained by applying a
homodyne detection on mode A after mixing A0 and C0
with a balanced beam-splitter transformation (SBSA0C0).
The matrix γA0C0B = γA0B ⊕ γC0 and γA0B actually is
γAB in Eq. (11), γC0 is a unit matrix. So we can get
γXˆABC=


b− c2/(a+ 1) 0 √2c/(a+ 1) 0
0 b 0 −c/√2√
2c/(a+ 1) 0 2a/(a+ 1) 0
0 −c/√2 0 (a+ 1)/2


(28)
and the symplectic eigenvalues of it
λ4,5 =
√
C ∓√C2 − 4D
2
, (29)
where C = a+bB+A
a+1 and D =
B(b+B)
a+1 . The Holevo bound
then reads
χAE(V, T,N) =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
j=4
G
(
λj − 1
2
)
,
(30)
χwAE = χAE(V, ηT, 1). (31)
Substituting Eqs. (30) and (31) into Eqs. (22) and (23),
respectively, the secret key rates in these two cases are
obtained. In Fig. 4, we plotted them for channel trans-
mission T with various values of η and find that the dif-
ference between the pseudosecret key rate with Bob not
monitoring LO and the truly secret one is still increasing
with the channel transmission T becoming smaller.
For Eve, when Bob does not monitor LO, she will get
the partial or total secret key rate (KwDR−KDR) without
being found by subtracting Eq. (22) from Eq. (23) when
she reduces the intensity of LO. In Fig. 5, we plotted the
pseudosecret key rate for direct reconciliation and the
mutual information overestimated by Alice and Bob. We
find that for short distance communication (less 15 km
or 3 dB limit), a small fluctuation of LO intensity could
still hide Eve’s attack partially or totally.
Note that in the above estimation we assume each
pulse’s transmission rate η (or attenuation rate 1 − η)
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Direct reconciliation pseudosecret key
rate and truly secret one vs channel transmission T under
LOIA. Solid lines are secret key rates estimated by Bob with-
out monitoring LO intensity and dashed lines are the truly
secret ones. Colors correspond to the LO transmissions as
labeled. Here Alice’s modulation variance VS = 20.
is identical. However, when η is different for each pulse
(Eve simulates the fluctuation of LO to hide her dra-
matic attack on LO), Eve still could intercept as much
as or even more secret key rates than above for reverse
and direct reconciliation, as long as the largest value of
η among all pulses (or approximately most pulse trans-
mission rates) is smaller than the above constant value.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our analysis shows that reverse reconciliation is more
sensitive than direct reconciliation about the fluctuation
of LO intensity, and, even with a small attenuation of LO
intensity, Eve can get full secret keys but not be found.
This is consistent with the fact that channel excess noise
has a more severe impact on reverse reconciliation than
on direct reconciliation. Of course, when the intensity
of LO fluctuates above the initial calibrated value (i.e.,
η > 1), Eve could not get any secret keys, but Alice and
Bob would overestimate Eve’s intercepted information
due to the overestimation of channel excess noise. How-
ever, when LO fluctuates around the initial calibrated
value, how to quantify Eve’s information is still an open
question, because the distribution of the fluctuation of
LO (or η) is not a normal distribution and unclear for
Alice and Bob due to Eve’s arbitrary manipulation. But
in this circumstance, Eve still could intercept partial se-
cret keys if she increases the channel excess noise of one
part of the signal pulses when she controls η < 1 and de-
creases it for the other part when controlling η > 1, i.e.,
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Direct reconciliation pseudosecret key
rate (dashed lines) and intercepted one (solid lines) by Eve
without being found vs LO intensity fluctuation rate (1− η)
with different transmission distances. From top to bottom
the transmission distances are labeled, and the fiber loss is
0.2 dB/km. Here Alice’s modulation variance VS = 20.
making the overall estimated excess noise by Alice and
Bob lower than the real one. Remarkably, LO intensity
fluctuation opens a loophole for Eve to attack the practi-
cal system, especially in the case of communication with
low channel transmission or over long distance.
Consequently, in the practical implementation of
CVQKD, we must monitor the LO fluctuation carefully
and in particular scale the measurements with instanta-
neous intensity values of LO. Alternatively, we can also
scale with the lowest intensity value of LO if the fluctu-
ations are very small, but it will estimate the secret key
rate pessimistically thus leading to the reduction of the
efficiency of the key distribution. However, we cannot
use the average intensity value of LO to normalize the
measurements as most current implementations do, be-
cause it still could overestimate the secret key rate for
Alice and Bob. Additionally, for reverse reconciliation
communication over long distance, very small fluctuation
of LO might compromise the secret key rate completely,
which presents a big challenge for accurately monitoring
LO intensity.
Finally, we point out that in this paper we do not
consider the imperfections of BHD such as detection
efficiency, electronic noise, and incomplete subtraction,
which may make LO intensity fluctuation have a more
severe impact on estimating the secret key rate for Alice
and Bob.
In conclusion, we have analyzed the effect of LO in-
tensity fluctuation on the secret key rate estimation of
Alice and Bob for reverse and direct reconciliation. In-
credibly, Bob’s estimation of the secret key rate will be
compromised severely without monitoring LO or if his
measurements do not scale with LO instantaneous inten-
sity values even with monitoring but just discard large
fluctuation pulses like in [16]. Furthermore, we have
shown that Eve could hide her attack partially by re-
ducing the intensity of LO and even could steal the total
secret keys Alice and Bob share without being found by
a small attenuation of LO intensity, especially for reverse
reconciliation. Finally, we have also briefly discussed the
monitoring of LO and pointed out that it would be a
challenge for highly accurate monitoring.
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Appendix A: Security estimation by Entangling
Cloner under LOIA
In this Appendix, we calculate the Holevo bound ob-
tained by Eve for direct and reverse reconciliation using
Weedbrook’s entangling cloner model [21, 22], and then
give the secret key rate shared by Alice and Bob under
LOIA. We begin the analysis by calculating the Von Neu-
mann entropy of Eve’s intercepting state first.
As Fig. 1(c) shows, the entangling cloner consists of
Eve replacing the Gaussian quantum channel between
Alice and Bob with a beam splitter of transmission T
and an EPR pair of variance N . Half of the EPR pair
mode E0 is mixed with Alice’s mode in the beam splitter
and is sent to Bob to match the noise of the real channel
by tuning N. The other half mode E2 is kept by Eve
to reduce the uncertainty on one output of the beam
splitter, the mode E1, which can be read as
XˆE1 = −
√
1− TXˆA +
√
TXˆE0 , (A1)
where XˆE0 is the quadrature of mode E0. Thus, the
variance of mode E1 is given by
VE1 = (1− T )V + TN, (A2)
and the conditional variance VE1|A can be calculated as,
using Eq. (10),
VE1|A = (1 − T ) + TN. (A3)
Hence, Eve’s covariance matrix can be obtained as
γE(V, V )=
(
γE1 σ
T
E1E2
σE1E2 γE2
)
=
(
diag(VE1 , VE1) ZE1E2σz
ZE1E2σz NI
)
,
(A4)
7where ZE1E2 =
√
T (N2 − 1) and the notation diag(, )
stands for a matrix with the arguments on the diago-
nal elements and zeros everywhere else. The symplectic
eigenvalues of this covariance matrix are given by
λ1,2 =
√
∆∓√∆2 − 4D
2
, (A5)
where ∆ = V 2E1 + N
2 − 2Z2E1E2 , and D = (VE1N −
Z2E1E2)
2. Hence, the Von Neumann entropy of Eve’s state
is given by
S(E) = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
, (A6)
1. Direct reconciliation
For the direct reconciliation protocol of CVQKD, the
Holevo bound between Eve and Alice is given by Eq. (24),
where S(E) has been calculated by Eq. (A6). S(E|A) can
be obtained by the conditional covariance matrix
γXAE = γE(V = 1, V ), (A7)
and its symplectic eigenvalues are given by
λ3,4 =
√
A∓√A2 − 4B
2
, (A8)
where A = VE1|AVE1+N
2−2Z2E1E2 , and B = (VE1|AN−
Z2E1E2)(VE1N−Z2E1E2). Thus, the conditional entropy is
S(E|A) = G
(
λ3 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ4 − 1
2
)
. (A9)
Substituting Eqs. (A6) and (A9) into Eq. (24), we can
get the mutual information between Alice and Eve,
χAE(V, T,N) = S(E)− S(E|A). (A10)
Under LOIA, Bob’s estimation of the Holevo bound with-
out monitoring LO intensity then reads, using Eq. (A10),
χwAE = χAE(V, ηT, 1). (A11)
With Eqs. (A10) and (A11), the secret key rates in
Eqs. (22) and (23) then can be calculated respectively,
and the calculation numerically demonstrates that they
are perfectly consistent with the Fig. 4.
2. Reverse reconciliation
The calculation of the Holevo bound between Eve and
Bob for reverse reconciliation is a bit more complicated.
Using Eq. (17), we only need to calculate the conditional
entropy S(E|B), which is determined by the symplectic
eigenvalues λ4,5 of the covariance matrix γ
XˆB
E ,
γXˆBE = γE − σTE1E2B(XγBX)MPσE1E2B , (A12)
where σE1E2B = (〈XˆE1XˆB〉I, 〈XˆE2XˆB〉σz) =
(ZE1BI, ZE2Bσz) and ZE1B =
√
T (1− T )(N − V ),
ZE2B =
√
1− T√N2 − 1. Then, γXˆBE can be recast as
γXˆBE =
(
F HT
H G
)
(A12′)
where
F = diag
(
VE1−
Z2
E1B
VB
, VE1
)
, G = diag
(
N−Z
2
E2B
VB
, N
)
,
and
H = diag
(
ZE1E2 − ZE1BZE2BVB ,−ZE1E2
)
.
Hence, its symplectic eigenvalues are given by
λ5,6 =
√
C ∓√C2 − 4D′
2
, (A13)
where C = det(F ) + det(G) + 2det(H), D′ = det(γXˆBE ),
and det(·) is the determinant of a matrix. So, we get the
conditional entropy
S(E|B) = G
(
λ5 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ6 − 1
2
)
, (A14)
and then the Holevo bound
χBE(V, T,N) = S(E)− S(E|B). (A15)
Consequently, without monitoring LO intensity, Alice
and Bob will give Eve the Holevo bound
χwBE = χBE(V, ηT, 1). (A16)
Substituting Eqs. (A15) and (A16) into Eqs. (14) and
(15), respectively, the secret key rates with and without
Bob’s monitoring can be obtained, and for channel trans-
mission T with various values of η, they are numerically
demonstrated to be perfectly consistent with Fig. 2, too.
Hence, it also indirectly confirms that either for direct or
reverse reconciliation, the entangling cloner could reach
the Holevo bound against the optimal Gaussian collective
attack.
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